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noteflow/spikes/spike_04_encryption/FINDINGS.md
Travis Vasceannie af1285b181 Add initial project structure and files
- Introduced .python-version for Python version management.
- Added AGENTS.md for documentation on agent usage and best practices.
- Created alembic.ini for database migration configurations.
- Implemented main.py as the entry point for the application.
- Established pyproject.toml for project dependencies and configurations.
- Initialized README.md for project overview.
- Generated uv.lock for dependency locking.
- Documented milestones and specifications in docs/milestones.md and docs/spec.md.
- Created logs/status_line.json for logging status information.
- Added initial spike implementations for UI tray hotkeys, audio capture, ASR latency, and encryption validation.
- Set up NoteFlow core structure in src/noteflow with necessary modules and services.
- Developed test suite in tests directory for application, domain, infrastructure, and integration testing.
- Included initial migration scripts in infrastructure/persistence/migrations for database setup.
- Established security protocols in infrastructure/security for key management and encryption.
- Implemented audio infrastructure for capturing and processing audio data.
- Created converters for ASR and ORM in infrastructure/converters.
- Added export functionality for different formats in infrastructure/export.
- Ensured all new files are included in the repository for future development.
2025-12-17 18:28:59 +00:00

3.0 KiB

Spike 4: Key Storage + Encryption - FINDINGS

Status: VALIDATED

All exit criteria met with in-memory key storage. OS keyring requires further testing.

Performance Results

Tested on Linux (Python 3.12, cryptography 42.0):

Operation Time Throughput
DEK wrap 4.4ms -
DEK unwrap 0.4ms -
Chunk encrypt (16KB) 0.039ms 398 MB/s
Chunk decrypt (16KB) 0.017ms 893 MB/s
File encrypt (1MB) 1ms 826 MB/s
File decrypt (1MB) 1ms 1.88 GB/s

Conclusion: Encryption is fast enough for real-time audio (<1ms per 16KB chunk).

Implementation Summary

Files Created

  • protocols.py - Defines KeyStore, CryptoBox, AssetWriter/Reader protocols
  • keystore_impl.py - KeyringKeyStore and InMemoryKeyStore implementations
  • crypto_impl.py - AesGcmCryptoBox, ChunkedAssetWriter/Reader implementations
  • demo.py - Interactive demo with throughput benchmarks

Key Design Decisions

  1. Envelope Encryption: Master key wraps per-meeting DEKs
  2. AES-256-GCM: Industry standard authenticated encryption
  3. 12-byte nonce: Standard for AES-GCM (96 bits)
  4. 16-byte tag: Full 128-bit authentication tag
  5. Chunked file format: 4-byte length prefix + nonce + ciphertext + tag

File Format

Header:
  4 bytes: magic ("NFAE")
  1 byte: version (1)

Chunks (repeated):
  4 bytes: chunk length (big-endian)
  12 bytes: nonce
  N bytes: ciphertext
  16 bytes: authentication tag

Overhead

  • Per-chunk: 28 bytes (12 nonce + 16 tag) + 4 length prefix = 32 bytes
  • For 16KB chunks: 0.2% overhead
  • For 1MB file: ~2KB overhead

Exit Criteria Status

  • Master key stored in OS keychain (InMemory validated; Keyring requires GUI)
  • Encrypt/decrypt roundtrip works
  • <1ms per 16KB chunk encryption (0.039ms achieved)
  • DEK deletion renders file unreadable (validated)
  • keyring works on Linux (requires SecretService daemon)

Cross-Platform Notes

  • Linux: Requires SecretService (GNOME Keyring or KWallet running)
  • macOS: Uses Keychain (should work out of box)
  • Windows PyInstaller: Known issue - must explicitly import keyring.backends.Windows

Running the Demo

# In-memory key storage (no dependencies)
python -m spikes.spike_04_encryption.demo

# With OS keyring (requires SecretService on Linux)
python -m spikes.spike_04_encryption.demo --keyring

# Larger file test
python -m spikes.spike_04_encryption.demo --size 10485760  # 10MB

Security Considerations

  1. Master key never leaves keyring (only accessed via API)
  2. Each meeting has unique DEK (compromise one ≠ compromise all)
  3. Nonce randomly generated per chunk (no reuse)
  4. Authentication tag prevents tampering
  5. Cryptographic delete: removing DEK makes data unrecoverable

Next Steps

  1. Test with OS keyring on system with SecretService
  2. Add PyInstaller-specific keyring backend handling
  3. Consider adding file metadata (creation time, checksum)
  4. Evaluate compression before encryption