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noteflow/spikes/spike_04_encryption/FINDINGS.md
Travis Vasceannie af1285b181 Add initial project structure and files
- Introduced .python-version for Python version management.
- Added AGENTS.md for documentation on agent usage and best practices.
- Created alembic.ini for database migration configurations.
- Implemented main.py as the entry point for the application.
- Established pyproject.toml for project dependencies and configurations.
- Initialized README.md for project overview.
- Generated uv.lock for dependency locking.
- Documented milestones and specifications in docs/milestones.md and docs/spec.md.
- Created logs/status_line.json for logging status information.
- Added initial spike implementations for UI tray hotkeys, audio capture, ASR latency, and encryption validation.
- Set up NoteFlow core structure in src/noteflow with necessary modules and services.
- Developed test suite in tests directory for application, domain, infrastructure, and integration testing.
- Included initial migration scripts in infrastructure/persistence/migrations for database setup.
- Established security protocols in infrastructure/security for key management and encryption.
- Implemented audio infrastructure for capturing and processing audio data.
- Created converters for ASR and ORM in infrastructure/converters.
- Added export functionality for different formats in infrastructure/export.
- Ensured all new files are included in the repository for future development.
2025-12-17 18:28:59 +00:00

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# Spike 4: Key Storage + Encryption - FINDINGS
## Status: VALIDATED
All exit criteria met with in-memory key storage. OS keyring requires further testing.
## Performance Results
Tested on Linux (Python 3.12, cryptography 42.0):
| Operation | Time | Throughput |
|-----------|------|------------|
| DEK wrap | 4.4ms | - |
| DEK unwrap | 0.4ms | - |
| Chunk encrypt (16KB) | 0.039ms | **398 MB/s** |
| Chunk decrypt (16KB) | 0.017ms | **893 MB/s** |
| File encrypt (1MB) | 1ms | **826 MB/s** |
| File decrypt (1MB) | 1ms | **1.88 GB/s** |
**Conclusion**: Encryption is fast enough for real-time audio (<1ms per 16KB chunk).
## Implementation Summary
### Files Created
- `protocols.py` - Defines KeyStore, CryptoBox, AssetWriter/Reader protocols
- `keystore_impl.py` - KeyringKeyStore and InMemoryKeyStore implementations
- `crypto_impl.py` - AesGcmCryptoBox, ChunkedAssetWriter/Reader implementations
- `demo.py` - Interactive demo with throughput benchmarks
### Key Design Decisions
1. **Envelope Encryption**: Master key wraps per-meeting DEKs
2. **AES-256-GCM**: Industry standard authenticated encryption
3. **12-byte nonce**: Standard for AES-GCM (96 bits)
4. **16-byte tag**: Full 128-bit authentication tag
5. **Chunked file format**: 4-byte length prefix + nonce + ciphertext + tag
### File Format
```
Header:
4 bytes: magic ("NFAE")
1 byte: version (1)
Chunks (repeated):
4 bytes: chunk length (big-endian)
12 bytes: nonce
N bytes: ciphertext
16 bytes: authentication tag
```
### Overhead
- Per-chunk: 28 bytes (12 nonce + 16 tag) + 4 length prefix = 32 bytes
- For 16KB chunks: 0.2% overhead
- For 1MB file: ~2KB overhead
## Exit Criteria Status
- [x] Master key stored in OS keychain (InMemory validated; Keyring requires GUI)
- [x] Encrypt/decrypt roundtrip works
- [x] <1ms per 16KB chunk encryption (0.039ms achieved)
- [x] DEK deletion renders file unreadable (validated)
- [ ] keyring works on Linux (requires SecretService daemon)
## Cross-Platform Notes
- **Linux**: Requires SecretService (GNOME Keyring or KWallet running)
- **macOS**: Uses Keychain (should work out of box)
- **Windows PyInstaller**: Known issue - must explicitly import `keyring.backends.Windows`
## Running the Demo
```bash
# In-memory key storage (no dependencies)
python -m spikes.spike_04_encryption.demo
# With OS keyring (requires SecretService on Linux)
python -m spikes.spike_04_encryption.demo --keyring
# Larger file test
python -m spikes.spike_04_encryption.demo --size 10485760 # 10MB
```
## Security Considerations
1. Master key never leaves keyring (only accessed via API)
2. Each meeting has unique DEK (compromise one ≠ compromise all)
3. Nonce randomly generated per chunk (no reuse)
4. Authentication tag prevents tampering
5. Cryptographic delete: removing DEK makes data unrecoverable
## Next Steps
1. Test with OS keyring on system with SecretService
2. Add PyInstaller-specific keyring backend handling
3. Consider adding file metadata (creation time, checksum)
4. Evaluate compression before encryption